Economic impact of farmer-driven vertical integration: the case of safe vegetable chains in northern Vietnam by Wang, Huaiyu et al.
1 
 
Economic impact of farmer-driven vertical integration: the case of safe 
vegetable chains in northern Vietnam  
 
Huaiyu Wang, IRRI, DAPO Box 7777, Metro Manila 1301, Philippines; h.wang@irri.org 
Paule Moustier, CIRAD, UMR MOISA, Montpellier, F-34398, France; moustier@cirad.fr 
Nguyen Thi Tan Loc, VAAS-FAVRI, Hanoi, Vietnam; nguyen.thi.tan.loc@gmail.com  
5èmes journées de recherche en sciences sociales à Dijon, INRA-CIRAD-SFER, 8 et 9 
décembre 2011 
2 
 
Summary 
The paper investigates the respective profitability of contractual arrangements, direct sales 
and spot marketing for ―safe vegetable‖ farmers in northern Vietnam. It is based on a survey 
of 137 peri-urban vegetable farmers, with a minimum of 30 farmers in each category. 
Selection biases are corrected using propensity score matching methods. The results show that 
direct sales and contractual arrangements have a significant positive impact on income 
compared to spot marketing when selection biases are corrected. Contractual arrangements 
have less impact on income compared with the direct sales after correction of selection bias. 
This may be due to the still limited involvement of purchasers in the production process. The 
paper illustrates that direct relations between farmers and consumers, often described in 
literature as efficient in the development of consumer confidence in terms of quality, can 
indeed translate into higher income than anonymous exchange or sales under contractual 
arrangements with retailing companies. Some limitations of the research are given in the 
conclusion, along with policy recommendations. 
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Introduction 
It is increasingly acknowledged that access to high-value chains has a positive impact on 
farmer incomes and poverty alleviation (World Bank, 2008). Rising incomes and fast 
urbanization are driving up the demand for high-value produce, including fruit, vegetables 
and meat, as well as heightening consumer concern for food safety. This, combined with the 
liberalization of foreign direct investment, led to the mushrooming of supermarkets in 
developing countries starting in the mid-1980s in Latin America and then rapidly spreading to 
Asia and Africa in the 1990s (Reardon et al., 2003).  
Like many countries of Southeast Asia, Vietnam is characterized by fast economic 
development and urban growth. The GDP growth rate was 8.5 percent in 2007 (7.5 for Laos 
and 4.8 for Thailand). In 2005, the urbanization rate was 26.4 percent, while the urban growth 
rate stood at 3.13 percent (Wup, 2009). Food safety and food freshness have become of 
primary importance to urban consumers, especially for vegetables, fruit and meat (Figuié et 
al., 2004). It is estimated that the value of the retail trade in USD grew at a rate of 10 percent 
per year for the period from 2001 to 2006, and that of modern trade at 20 percent per year in 
the same period. The share of supermarkets in retail food marketing is nevertheless still 
limited (around 14 percent) (USDA, 2009). Most foodstuffs are still sold in retail wet markets, 
both planned and spontaneous. 
On the supply side, Vietnam is characterized by a dynamic agricultural sector which still faces 
structural constraints. Most vegetables available in Hanoi are produced in peri-urban zones 
where the limited size of land plots, generally under 500 m², and property speculation result in 
farmers using increased quantities of fertilizer and pesticides to maximize productivity per 
hectare. All farmers in Hanoi belong to cooperatives, which are mostly active in the area of 
infrastructure, e.g. irrigation, while some of them are involved in input and output marketing, 
as well as organization of trainings. In 1995, public interest in the safety of vegetable produce 
led the Vietnam Ministry of Agriculture to implement an ambitious program called ―safe 
vegetables.‖ The program educated farmers in the reasonable use of fertilizer and pesticides, 
based on IPM principles, as well as in the use of water from wells and non-polluted rivers. 
Similar programs were organized by NGOs.  
Some cooperatives received support under such programs to get access to retailing points or 
to enter into contracts with distribution companies, canteens, schools, shops or supermarkets, 
and to have their vegetable output labeled as ―safe,‖ including indication of the place of 
production. All of these outlets charge premium prices for ―safe vegetables,‖ although these 
are highly inconsistent. Shops and market stalls may be run by intermediate traders or by 
farmer groups themselves. Supermarkets commonly sign contracts with safe vegetable groups 
or buy from distribution companies that contract out their supply to farmer groups. These 
contracts specify the frequency of delivery, quality requirements (including visual criteria and 
the provision of certification) and terms of payment (cash, 15 to 30 days after delivery). Safe 
vegetable production certificates are awarded by the Plant Protection Department of Hanoi 
municipality. In 2008, Hanoi had 27 cooperatives holding safe vegetable production 
certificates, accounting for around 2 percent of the Hanoi vegetable growing area (while the 
safe vegetable program covers approximately 20 per cent of the area).  
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Despite the growing demand for safe food, farmers frequently complain about the low 
profitability of vegetable production and the strong inconsistency of their income. Not all 
farmers are successful in finding traders offering to buy their vegetables at premium prices. In 
this paper, we address the following issue: What kind of vertical coordination is the most 
beneficial for farmers involved in quality efforts? 
Changes in consumer demand and in the retailing sector are creating new market 
opportunities, but are also thrusting new challenges on small-scale farmers, as the new 
markets have special requirements in terms of quality and delivery deadlines. Contractual 
arrangements between farmers or farmer groups and buyers, and more generally vertical 
integration in the chain, have been documented as efficient ways to overcome these 
challenges and increase farmer incomes. Vertical integration involves the participation of one 
firm in two adjacent stages in the vertical marketing channel from producer to consumer, in 
terms of decisions and/or ownership (Carlton and Perloff, 1994). The role of vertical 
integration in reducing transaction costs was brought to the fore by Williamson (1987). 
Transaction costs means all indirect costs occurred in setting up, conducting and monitoring 
the transaction, i.e. the cost of searching out, selecting, agreeing to, implementing and 
enforcing contracts (North, 1990). Measurement costs of quality characteristics are specific 
types of transaction costs. The safety of food produce is a quality attribute that is especially 
difficult to observe and measure. The consequences of quality measurement constraints on the 
supply of low-quality produce (as good quality produce does not get a quality premium) and 
even disappearance of market transactions have been demonstrated by Akerlov (1970). 
Increased vertical integration is a response to a greater number of quality measurement errors 
(Barzel, 1982).  
A typology of forms of coordination according to degree of vertical integration can be found 
in various papers on transaction costs economics, including Williamson (1987) and Jaffee 
(1993). At the two extremes lie market coordination and hierarchy (or the firm). Market 
coordination generally refers to coordination of the selling and purchasing operations through 
the fixing and publicizing of prices, i.e. price incentives. The firm is typically a centralized, 
hierarchical organization, which stands in contrast to classical market contracting. Hierarchy 
refers to the centralization of decisions, command-and-control approaches with coercive 
power translated into regulations. Hybrid forms are intermediary forms between markets and 
hierarchies, with some sharing in decision making between the two partners in the transaction. 
These include different types of contracts. A contract can be defined as a set of commitments 
on the conditions of transactions, e.g. prices, volumes, quantities, input provision. Vertical 
integration increases from spot markets and market reciprocity to contracts and hierarchy. 
Vertical integration reduces transaction costs, but, on the other hand, it increases governance 
costs, that is, the costs of ensuring that the arrangements are complied with.  
Numerous empirical tests have been conducted showing that contractual arrangements reduce 
transaction costs. (See in particular Shelanski and Klein, 1995 for a review.) Further, in the 
last ten years, studies measuring the benefits of contractual arrangements for farmers have 
developed. A review of existing studies was recently made by Miyata and al. (2009), showing 
the positive impact of contracts on farmer incomes. Yet, most existing studies compare 
incomes of farmers with and without contracts, and do not provide for selection biases related 
to differences in characteristics (observable and unobservable) between farmers that enter into 
contracts and those who do not. These selection biases can be reduced by various econometric 
methods, including propensity score matching (PSM). (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) This 
technique was used by Miyata et al. (2009) in their study of contracts for marketing apples 
and green onions in Shandong province, China. Their conclusion is that contract farmers earn 
more than their neighbors growing the same crops even after controlling for observable and 
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unobservable characteristics. Another rigorous evaluation (based on PSM techniques) of the 
economic impact of different modes of coordination in food chains was conducted by 
Maertens and Swinnen (2009) in the case of vegetable exports in Senegal. A comparison of 
incomes was conducted between farmers under contract with export companies, farmers 
employed by exporter estate farms and independent farmers. The study showed that contract 
farmers earn more than vertically integrated farmers who themselves earn more than farmers 
outside export schemes (neither contracted nor vertically integrated). 
Yet, it is difficult to conclude from the latter study that contractual arrangements bring 
additional income when compared to spot marketing. Incomes from green beans exported 
(through contracts) are compared with incomes of farmers not involved in contracts. Thus, it 
is the introduction of a new crop rather than the form of coordination that generates additional 
incomes. Besides, even when the same crops are considered, as is the case in the study by 
Miyata et al. (2009), the quality characteristics are different between farmers selling under 
contract and those without a contract. It is therefore difficult to come to a conclusion 
regarding the impact of the contract versus the impact of quality upgrading. Finally, it would 
be interesting to compare the effect of contractual arrangements with other ways of 
coordinating transactions in a chain where specific quality attributes are involved, generating 
high transaction costs. Existing studies focus mainly on vertical integration driven by the 
buyer, who provides inputs in exchange for the product purchase. Another possible situation 
of vertical integration is when farmers engage in retailing, which can be termed as farmer-
driven vertical integration. The case of safe vegetables in Vietnam provides a good basis for 
evaluating the impact of different types of vertical coordination. 
In this paper, we evaluate the impact on incomes of three different types of intra-chain 
coordination observed to market ―safe‖ vegetables (defined as vegetables produced according 
to IPM methods, whether certified or not): spot marketing, corresponding to marketing to 
collectors without commitments in terms of inputs or outputs; contractual arrangements with 
supermarkets; direct sales to consumers. The next section details the methodology used. Then 
the results of the survey and data analysis will be presented and discussed. Finally, the 
conclusion will summarize the main results and their implications in terms of new research 
and policy recommendations. 
Method 
We will first present the characteristics of the survey, followed by the way the data was 
processed and analyzed. 
Data collection  
From August to December 2008, we conducted a survey of 137 peri-urban vegetable 
farmers in safe vegetable production areas. They market their vegetables in three ways: 
(1) selling to collectors in spot markets (66 farmers); (2) selling directly to consumers in 
rented shops or market stalls (30 farmers); (3) selling to supermarkets or to companies 
through contracts (41 farmers). We then conducted interviews with the leaders of the nine 
farmer cooperatives to which the contract farmers belonged or sold directly to better 
understand the contract specifications and the strategies of the group as regards marketing. 
It should be noted that farmers frequently combine different marketing strategies. We 
selected farmers selling more than half of their vegetables through one channel in order to 
define which of the three respective market coordination groups they belonged to (spot 
marketing, direct sales or contract). This explains the smaller size of the sample for the second 
and third situations. 
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 Moreover, supermarkets and companies contract with farmer organizations rather than 
with individual farmers. But the interviews with the co-op leaders show that the contracts are 
filled by a small number of farmers in the group (two to five) who sell their own produce plus 
that of some neighboring farmers. Likewise, the farmer co-op shops are run by a small group 
of farmers who sell their vegetables and act as collectors for the rest of the group. Hence, the 
marketing strategies are individual rather than collective. The collective pattern of the farmer 
organizations relates mostly to quality development and labeling (Moustier et al., 2010). 
The questionnaire gathered details on household characteristics: age, number of persons in 
the labor force (aged between 15 and 65), level of education of the head of the household; 
landholdings; planting cycle; vegetable production; marketing strategies; distance to markets 
and roads; household income; agricultural income from vegetable and non-vegetable 
production. As stated by Miyata and al. (2009), household income is a better indicator than 
vegetable income regarding the effect of the contract on well-being because the contract may 
draw labor or land away from other activities.  
Data analysis 
Descriptive analysis was used to show and compare the basic household characteristics. To 
estimate the impact of different forms of coordination in vegetable chains, regression and 
matching techniques taken from average treatment effects literature were applied to correct 
the selection bias resulting from the stakeholders’ decision and output (Jalan and Ravallion, 
2003; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009). Taking farmers under contract or selling directly to 
consumers as treatment groups and farmers selling in spot market as a control group in the 
study, the value of average treatment effects (ATE) is defined as the average difference 
between household income with and without treatment for those who actually participated in 
treatment. Two treatments were considered: contracts with companies and direct sales. These 
treatments were applied to farmers independently from their characteristics: cooperatives 
were selected from what can be approximated to a ―queuing list,‖ because market stalls, 
shops, canteens and supermarkets are limited in supply. Y1 and Y2 represent the income with 
treatment and Y0 the income without treatment. 
)( 011 YYEATE  for 11T : with contract 
)( 022 YYEATE  for 12T : selling directly  
The hypothesis is that vertical coordination, whether in the form of contracts or direct 
sales, has a positive impact on household income and therefore both ATEs are significantly 
positive. Observable covariates related to participation and family income as output were 
selected from the survey for the selection bias adjustment. (Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; 
Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Dehejia and Wahba, 1999) The result is shown in Table 1. The 
covariates are farmer access to resources (including landholdings, labor and distance from 
nearest market), , age, education and family size. The number of motorbikes was not selected 
because of this being a potential endogenous problem, although it is a typical variable in 
Vietnam to indicate family assets. The number of motorbikes could be an endogenous 
variable related to income because it is difficult to identify whether farmers with a higher 
income buy more motorbikes or whether more motorbikes help farmers increase their income 
because they facilitate the transportation and sale of produce.  
Three components in the econometric analysis enable comparison of the impact of the 
different forms of coordination and identification of the selection bias. First, we use the 
covariate matching method to implement the regression on household income and the 
selection bias is controlled by including observable covariates. Farmer participation is 
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included in the covariates to estimate the average treatment effects. The ATEs can be 
estimated as the coefficients of covariates for treatment in the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression (Imbens, 2004; Wooldridge, 2002). Model I is specified as:  
iii XTYTFor 111 :)1(  
iii XTYTFor 222 :)1(  
Secondly, a probit model is used to estimate the probability of a given household 
participating in the treatment and the estimated marginal probabilities are included as an 
additional propensity score correction function in the regression. (Maertens and Swinnen, 
2009) This is to control the participation bias correlated to unobservable characteristics. And 
the ATEs can be estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression (Maertens and 
Swinnen, 2009; Imbens, 2004; Wooldridge, 2002).  
Model II is specified as:  
iii XPTYTFor 1111 :)1(  
iii XPTYTFor 2222 :)1(  
with )|1(
^
XTpP ii  
The third econometric analysis is to estimate ATEs using the propensity score matching 
method because the counterfactuals are not directly observed. Non-experimental studies differ 
from randomized experiments in that the probability of participating in coordination is not a 
fixed constant but influenced by unobserved and observed characteristics due to self-selection 
and selection made by related stakeholders (Aakvik, 2001). Selection bias due to correlation 
between observed variables and household participation is solved by either matching 
techniques or by including these covariates in the regression analysis (Aakvik, 2001).  
As regards the model to be used for the estimation, there is little advice on functional form. 
Logit and probit models usually yield similar results for bivariate estimation (Caliendo and 
Kopeinig, 2008) A probit model was used in the propensity score matching analysis. We use 
the single nearest neighbor algorithm to identify the best match for each treated farmer, which 
is the most straightforward matching method and reduces bias. We also employ  radius and 
kernel-based matching The radius matching  draws on all the comparison members within the 
caliper which can avoid the risk of bad matches. The kernel-based matching uses  weighted 
averages of all individuals in the control group to construct the counterfactual outcome and 
the major advantage is with lower variance while using more information (Caliendo and 
Kopeinig, 2008; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) The propensity score matching method estimates 
ATEs and is specified as Model III:  
)(
1
1
1
1 ji
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ATE    
The average treatment effects on the treated can be estimated as follows:  
)1|))(,0|())(,1|(( ,, TXpTYEXpTYEEATT icontroliitreatmenti  
The estimator that yields the statistically identical covariates means for treatment and 
control groups is preferred. To assess the matching quality, several indicators were reviewed 
= =
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and used  to check if the matching procedure is able to balance the distribution of the relevant 
variables in both treatment and control group, i.e., there should not be systematic significant 
differences remaining after conditioning on the propensity score (Caliendo and Keopeinig, 
2008). They include the significant lower standardized bias (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985), 
statistically insignificant likelihood ratio test on the joint significance of all regressors (Smith 
and Todd, 2005), and fairly low pseudo-R
2
 (Sianesi, 2004) after matching.  
Non experimental studies differ from randomized experiments in that the probability of 
participating in technology adoption is not a fixed constant but influenced by unobserved and 
observed characteristics due to self-selection and selection made by related stakeholders 
(Aakvik, 2001). Rosenbaum (2002) suggested sensitivity analysis to check the hidden bias 
because of unobserved variables that simultaneously affect adoption and household income. 
This is based on the assessment of the region of common support as well as Rosenbaum 
bounds which we will present in the results section on robustness. 
All the data were entered and processed using the STATA software. We now turn to the 
results of the data analysis. 
Results  
We first present the results of the descriptive statistical analysis in terms of farm 
characteristics and incomes. Then, the results of the econometric analysis will be outlined, 
followed by the outcomes of some robustness tests.  
Descriptive analysis  
Farm characteristics 
Characteristics of households selling directly to consumers and contracted by supermarkets 
or firms are compared to those selling their vegetables in spot markets using the T test 
(Table 2). The significant differences between the three groups relate to the following 
characteristics: land area (largest for spot market, followed by contracts and direct sales); 
distance from the nearest market (higher for direct sales than for the other groups); number of 
persons in the labor force (highest for spot market); age (lower for contract farmers than for 
the other groups); education level (highest for contract farmers). 
Incomes 
The survey shows that the highest incomes are obtained by farmers selling directly to 
consumers, both as regards vegetable income and total household income. Second come 
incomes of contract farmers, followed by farmers selling in spot markets.—See Figure 1.  
Vegetable production is an important income source for farmers, especially for the contract 
and direct sales farmer groups (more than half of the overall income), compared with less than 
one third of the household income for those selling in spot markets. 
The following section investigates whether the differences in income result from the 
resource or location characteristics of households or from their participation in contract and 
vertical integration after correcting selection bias.  
Econometric analysis  
In table 3 we show the result of Model I, covariate matching method, by implementing 
OLS regression to estimate the ATEs. The estimate effects for direct sales and contracts are 
significantly positive at the 1-percent level. Household yearly income could be raised by 
29.25 million VND (US$1,827) by selling directly to consumers compared to selling to 
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traditional collectors through the spot market. The impact of a contract on household income 
is 14.4 million VND (US$899) which is less than half of the direct sales effect.   
Taking into account the probability that a given household participated in the treatment, 
Table 4 shows the results of Model II. Similar to the results of Model I, the estimated effect 
for direct sales and contracts are significant at the 1-percent level. And the extent of income 
increase is 27.26 million VND (US$1,703), which is quite close to that of Model I. This 
confirms the hypothesis that vertical integration in the form of selling directly to consumers or 
contracts can help raise farmer incomes. Although the estimated effect of a contract is 
significantly positive, 14.8 million VND (US$924), it is much less than the direct sales.  
The result of the bivariate probit in Table 5 shows that selling directly to consumers and 
selling under contract are biased towards households with less land. There is no significant 
effect of demographic characteristics on the probability of different forms of coordination.  
After implementing the propensity score matching method to correct the bias, Table 6 
shows the comparison of estimated treatment effect. Matching means that similar treatment 
and control units are paired in terms of their observable characteristics. (Maertens and 
Swinnen, 2009; Abadie and Imbens, 2002; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) The result of the 
estimated effect of nearest neighbor matching method for direct sales and contract is still 
significantly positive at the 5-percent level, with the difference of about 33 million VND 
(US$2,071)  and 17 million VND (US$1,057) for direct sales and contract respectively, which 
is higher than figures obtained in  Models I and II.We present the results of a comparison 
between before and after matching in Table 7, which indicates the possibility of a selection 
bias before matching.  
Robustness tests 
To estimate average treatment effects requires sufficient overlap and an area of common 
support between the treatment and control groups. (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Dehejia and 
Wahba, 2002; Imbens, 2004) ATE is difficult to estimate by matching techniques if 
households with and without coordination differ substantially in observable characteristics. 
(Maertens and Swinnen, 2009) There are two methods to check the overlap and common 
support. One is by comparing the minima and maxima of the propensity score and the other is 
based on estimating density distribution (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). We use the first and 
Figure 2 shows the comparison. It indicates sufficient overlap and common support where the 
propensity score of the treated group is not higher than the maximum propensity score of the 
control group or is less than that of the minimum one. Besides, the results of Table 8 show 
that there is a strong bias for most covariates. And the matching eliminates the bias so that 
there is a good balance of covariate distribution between treated and matched control units.  
To test robustness and unmeasured bias, we also calculated the Rosenbaum bounds for 
average treatment effects on the treated group in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity 
(hidden bias) between treatment and control units; and the critical level of gamma was shown 
in Table 7.  
  
Discussion 
The results show the profitability of farmer direct sales compared to selling to collectors in 
spot markets, and even to having contracts with supermarkets. Contracts with supermarkets 
show higher profitability than spot markets, but its effect is much smaller than direct sales. 
Direct sales provide economic benefits to farmers in the form of higher income, because they 
enable farmers to better promote their efforts in the realm of vegetable quality, especially 
10 
 
safety. Food safety generates a number of information deficiencies and opportunism risks, 
which are reduced by cutting out intermediary stages between farmers and consumers. This 
also benefits consumers who are reassured in terms of the way food is produced, in addition to 
getting access to fresher and more affordable food. (Prigent-Simonin and Hérault-Fournier, 
2005) Yet, direct sales may be constraining in terms of access to a market stall or store, which 
is becoming more and more difficult in a context of strong pressure on urban land (Moustier 
et Nguyen, 2010). 
The results are original because they show the profitability of vertical integration of retailing 
stages based on producers, while many papers investigate vertical integration of producing 
stages based on traders. Yet, some qualification is needed. The contracts observed in the safe 
vegetable chains have limited features of vertical integration. They are mostly systems to 
guarantee purchase and sale, rather than to get the purchaser involved in the production 
stages. Purchasers do not provide inputs or technical advice, and the extent of quality control 
is limited. 
The direction of covariates requires some explanation. We found that farmers involved in 
direct selling have a lower labor input than the others, while it might be anticipated that they 
are the ones more apt to provide labor, to spend time and effort in marketing activities. We 
can explain this finding by the fact that farmers involved in direct selling have less land, have 
less produce to sell and are more specialized than the other farmers: the share of vegetable 
income in total household income is 54 percent, while it is 33 percent for farmers involved in 
spot markets (see Figure 1) Hence, the smaller labor input is somehow compensated by less 
time spent in production (because of less land available) and due to the higher profitability of 
time spent per unit of land. 
Conclusion 
The paper is an original contribution to the few available studies investigating the impact on 
farmer incomes of alternative marketing strategies and chain coordination using robust 
econometric methods, with correction of selection biases. The paper demonstrates the positive 
impact on farmer incomes of direct sales between farmers and consumers, compared to sales 
to collectors in spot markets and to contracts with ―modern‖ buyers of commodities with the 
same quality characteristics, i.e. chemical-limited vegetables. A number of studies on the 
benefits of direct sales are available, but they are mostly in the field of sociology and 
geography, in developed countries, and the quantitative data are very limited (for reviews, see 
Deverre and Lamine, 2010, and Cadilhon, 2007). 
In terms of policy recommendations, our results indicate that if public support was given to 
farmers to enable them to sell their products directly, this could have a beneficial impact on 
their incomes. This could involve micro-credit programs, as well as facilitating the protection 
of areas available for direct farmer sales, including farmer retail markets, which still do not 
exist in Vietnam, in contrast with other countries. Besides, public food safety control needs to 
be improved to make the ―safe vegetable‖ label more credible. Currently, there is no strict 
control by an external authority regarding the origin of vegetables sold in the stalls and shops; 
the latter may well indiscriminately mix vegetables from various production areas and 
vegetables with inadequate certification. This could jeopardize the reputation—and hence the 
incomes—of farmers involved in quality efforts. 
The paper has some limitations and additional research is required. The issue of unobservable 
characteristics should be further investigated. Further explanation should be sought and 
confirmed as regards the unexpected direction of covariates. Besides, it would be worthwhile 
to carry out similar analyses with larger samples per treatment, which would imply extending 
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the research to other regions of Vietnam. It would be worthwhile to carry out a comparison of 
farmer-driven integration with retailer-driven integration in cases where there is more active 
involvement on the part of retailers in the production process, which may be more frequent in 
southern Vietnam than in northern Vietnam. Another situation is that of retailing companies 
involved in production through salaried workers. The profitability of salaried work could be 
compared with that of farmers under contract and independent farmers—provided that a 
significant number of farmers in a situation of salaried work can be found. 
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 Table 1. Observable covariates for selection bias adjustment of ATEs  
Covariate Description 
T1: Direct sales/ Spot T2: Contract/ Spot 
Income Treatment Income Treatment 
hhsize  Household size  (persons) 0.445*** -0.166 0.459*** -0.146 
agehead Age of household head 0.036 -0.207** 0.065 -0.162* 
labora Household labor endowments 0.366*** -0.277 0.434*** -0.272*** 
eduhead  Education of household head 0.292*** 0.001 0.080 0.198** 
land  Arable land area (ha) 0.062 -0.387*** 0.169* -0.312*** 
market Distance from nearest market (km) 0.053 0.239**   
geodum  Region dummy -0.192* -0.337   
a 
People aged from 15 to 65 were considered as being in the labor market.  
 
14 
 
Table 2 Comparison of household characteristics for different coordination forms 
 Total 
Selling in 
spot markets 
Selling 
directly to 
consumersc 
Contracted by 
supermarkets or 
company 
Number of households  137 66 30 41 
     
Household income (million VND) 64.24 57.93 81.42** 62.16  
Vegetable income (million VND) 29.38 19.03 44.32*** 35.09***  
Share of vegetable income (%) 45.96 36.23 56.22*** 54.27*** 
Agriculture income a (million VND) 31.63 21.91 44.72*** 37.62*** 
Agri. income per hectare (million VND/ha) 185.13 102.90 292.47*** 238.09*** 
     
Household size (persons)   4.47 4.71 4.17 4.29 
  Male (persons) 2.31 2.47 2.13 2.20 
  Female (persons) 2.15 2.24 2.03 2.10 
Number of persons in the labor market b 3.48 3.86 3.07*** 3.17*** 
Share of labor input in the family 80% 85% 75% 75% 
Age of household head (years old) 34.58 36.22 34.32 32.13** 
Average education of family members (years) 8.36 8.76 8.10 7.84** 
Education of head (years)     
     
Arable land area (ha) 0.22 0.26 0.16*** 0.18*** 
Distance from nearest market (km) 0.94 0.88 1.26** 0.81 
Distance from nearest road (km) 0.25 0.27 0.24 0.21 
a 
Agriculture income only refers to farming on the arable land, not including livestock raising.  
b
 Person in the labor market refers to a person aged from 15 to 65.  
c 
Characteristics of farmers selling directly to consumers and those contracted by supermarkets or companies are 
compared to those selling their vegetables in spot markets using the T test. Significant differences are indicated 
with *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.  
 
15 
 
Table 3. Regression on covariates by implementing OLS regression to estimate ATEs 
 
T1: Direct sales /Spot T2: Contract /Spot 
 
Coef.  Std.Err Coef.  Std.Err 
Contract (0= spot market) 29.246*** 9.976 14.403* 7.582 
household size(persons) 14.301*** 4.082 7.706** 3.485 
agehead 1.101 0.673 0.320 0.400 
labors by age of [15,65] 2.161 4.854 7.817* 4.108 
eduhead 5.492*** 1.838 1.297 1.571 
total land area (ha) 31.689 42.272 -0.979 35.716 
distance to nearest market(km) 4.068 5.254 
  
_cons -109.944*** 39.101 -34.646 28.606 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
            The region dummies are omitted. 
 
 
 
Table 4. Regression on propensity score to estimate ATEs 
 
T1: Direct sales /Spot T2: Contract /Spot 
Coef.  Std.Err Coef.  Std.Err 
Contract (0= spot market) 27.260** 11.342 14.838* 7.600 
PS 415.711 266.006 -187.380 197.335 
Household size(persons) -6.328 15.798 15.130* 8.561 
Agehead  4.053** 1.930 -0.244 0.716 
Labours by age of [15,65] 12.979 11.295 -9.330 18.520 
Eduhead 0.069 4.624 7.359 6.574 
Total land area (ha) 657.717* 365.555 -164.328 175.699 
Distance to nearest market(km) -34.110 27.006 
  
_cons -425.721** 186.936 75.165 119.134 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
            The region dummies are omitted. 
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Table 5. Propensity score estimated using a bivariate probit model  
Treatment 
T1: Direct sales /Spot T2: Contract /Spot 
Coef.  Std.Err Coef.  Std.Err 
household size(persons) 0.160 0.175 0.107 0.142 
agehead -0.015 0.026 -0.008 0.016 
labors by age of [15,65] -0.097 0.223 -0.257 0.170 
eduhead 0.043 0.077 0.088 0.061 
total land area (ha) -4.367* 2.410 -2.557** 1.201 
distance to nearest market(km) 0.281 0.200 
  
_cons 0.469 1.461 0.306 1.017 
Note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
            The region dummies are omitted. 
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Table 6. Average treatment effects (ATT) and results of sensitivity analysis 
Matching Algorithm ATT 
(million VND) 
Critical level of 
gamma 
Number of 
treated 
Number of 
control 
T1: Direct sales / Spot     
  Nearest neighbor matching  33.15** 1.65 – 1.70  21 21 
  Kernel-based matching  26.69* 1.30 – 1.35 23 21 
  Radius matching 27.58* 1.25 – 1.30 23 21 
T2: Contract / Spot     
  Nearest neighbor matching  16.92** 1.30 – 1.35 36 45 
  Kernel-based matching  17.96** 1.65 – 1.70 34 45 
  Radius matching 17.37** 1.70 – 1.75 36 45 
 
 
Table 7. PSM quality indicators before and after matching and sensitivity analysis  
 Pseudo R2 
before 
matching 
Pseudo R2 
after 
matching 
p > Chi 2 
before 
matching 
p < Chi 2 
after 
matching 
Mean SB 
before 
matching 
Mean SB 
after 
matching 
% |bias| 
reduction 
T1: Direct sales /Spot        
  Nearest neighbor matching  0.177 0.072 0.044 0.754 39.29 20.28 48 
  Kernel-based matching  0.177 0.019 0.044 0.990 39.29 8.66 78 
  Radius matching 0.177 0.023 0.044 0.983 39.29 7.14 82 
        
T2: Contract /Spot        
  Nearest neighbor matching  0.205 0.042 0.000 0.520 54.92 19.06 65 
  Kernel-based matching  0.205 0.025 0.000 0.805 54.92 16.05 71 
  Radius matching 0.205 0.023 0.000 0.814 54.92 15.22 72 
Note: SB is the standardized bias.  
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Figure 1. Household income and income from vegetables
Total household income Income from vegetables
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Figure 2. Propensity score distribution and common support for propensity score estimation 
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